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Abstract
Background: In early 2012, National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) members in Ashanti Region were allowed 
to choose their own primary healthcare providers. This paper investigates the factors that enrolees in the Ashanti 
Region considered in choosing preferred primary healthcare providers (PPPs) and direction of association of such 
factors with the choice of PPP. 
Methods: Using a cross-sectional study design, the study sampled 600 NHIS enrolees in Kumasi Metro area and 
Kwabre East district. The sampling methods were a combination of simple random and systematic sampling 
techniques at different stages. Descriptive statistics were used to analyse demographic information and the criteria 
for selecting PPP. Multinomial logistic regression technique was used to ascertain the direction of association of the 
factors and the choice of PPP using mission PPPs as the base outcome. 
Results: Out of the 600 questionnaires administered, 496 were retained for further analysis. The results show that 
availability of essential drugs (53.63%) and doctors (39.92%), distance or proximity (49.60%), provider reputation 
(39.52%), waiting time (39.92), additional charges (37.10%), and recommendations (48.79%) were the main criteria 
adopted by enrolees in selecting PPPs. In the regression, income (-0.0027), availability of doctors (-1.82), additional 
charges (-2.14) and reputation (-2.09) were statistically significant at 1% in influencing the choice of government 
PPPs. On the part of private PPPs, availability of drugs (2.59), waiting time (1.45), residence (-2.62), gender (-2.89), 
and reputation (-2.69) were statistically significant at 1% level. Presence of additional charges (-1.29) was statistically 
significant at 5% level.
Conclusion: Enrolees select their PPPs based on such factors as availability of doctors and essential drugs, reputation, 
waiting time, income, and their residence. Based on these findings, there is the need for healthcare providers to 
improve on their quality levels by ensuring constant availability of essential drugs, doctors, and shorter waiting 
time. However, individual enrolees may value each criterion differently. Thus, not all enrolees may be motivated 
by same concerns. This requires providers to be circumspect regarding the factors that may attract enrolees. The 
National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) should also ensure timely release of funds to help providers procure 
the necessary medical supplies to ensure quality service.
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Implications for policy makers
• Enrolees choose their preferred primary healthcare providers (PPPs) based on their own personal characteristics and provider characteristics. 
However, different enrolees may have different motivations for selecting a particular PPP at a time. 
• Policy-makers should allocate more funds to increase the number of primary healthcare facilities, especially in rural areas.
• The study also provides avenues for healthcare providers to optimise their roles in the health sector by improving quality levels. The National 
Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) should ensure timely disbursement of funds to providers to help them procure the necessary medical 
supplies.
Implications for public
The policy suggestions in the study will help improve satisfaction among patients. In this regard, enrolees should also make it a point to find more 
information about the providers they wish to choose as their preferred primary healthcare provider (PPP) and also switch providers when quality, 
in their perspective, is compromised to help ensure competition for quality.
Key Messages 
Background 
Across the globe, contemporary healthcare systems rely 
on competition as one of the mechanisms to contain the 
escalating healthcare costs. As pointed out by Annemarie and 
Hester,1 consumer choice is a pre-condition for competition to 
thrive in every market; and for decades, in health economics 
literature, patient (consumer) choice of healthcare provider 
has been seriously debated. Appleby et al2 have argued that 
patients will benefit, regardless of the choice they make, when 
offered a choice; and will consequently augment the cost 
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containment strategies of purchasers. 
In recent years, the patient choice concept has attracted 
considerable attention, for instance in the Netherlands, the 
United States, and the United Kingdom, due to its potential to 
create a more patient-centred care, improve efficiency, quality, 
and equity in healthcare use.3-5 In most advanced economies, 
with well-developed healthcare markets, health insurers 
and patients have the freedom to choose which hospital to 
contract and/or visit with fewer complexities.
One of the myriad ways of offering patients a choice is through 
patient list systems (as happens in Norway, the United 
States, and Denmark). Generally, patient list systems allow 
enrolees to choose their own healthcare providers or general 
practitioners (GPs) where they would receive treatment in 
times of sickness or emergency cases such as motor accidents. 
Enrolees have the opportunity to change providers, after a 
certain period, if they are not satisfied with service delivery. 
Consequently, patients may substitute distant healthcare 
providers for nearer ones due to differences in quality care, 
waiting times, and hospital reputation.6-9 In certain cases, 
purchasers (insurers) have limited and/or specified healthcare 
providers from which their patients can seek treatment, 
and usually, purchasers’ (insurers) bargaining power partly 
depends on patients’ willingness to change provider.5 
In early 2012, Ghana’s National Health Insurance Authority 
(NHIA) offered its enrolees in the Ashanti Region the option 
to choose their own primary healthcare providers via a patient 
list system called preferred primary healthcare provider (PPP). 
It was the NHIA’s intention to extend, after a year, the practice 
to the entire country depending on the success of the pilot 
in Ashanti Region. The nationwide implementation of the 
patient list system was expected to take-off after December 
2012. In view of this, NHIA accredited healthcare providers 
operating in the Ashanti Region (were) are usually prepaid 
for future provision of defined services to NHIA patients on 
the provider’s register. Enrolees are (were) at liberty to switch 
from one healthcare provider to the other, once in every 6 
months, if they are not satisfied with services received from 
the PPP. 
In effect, the revenue of  healthcare providers, especially 
private healthcare providers, would depend, partly, on the 
number of National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) 
subscribers on their roll. This has the potential to spark 
competition for quality healthcare delivery in Ghana. Indeed, 
this was one of NHIA’s motivations for the patient list system 
among others like improving pricing and reimbursement 
activities, and efficiency of providers.10 The success or 
otherwise of the programme and/or its effect on patients is 
not within the purview of the present study.11-14 
The basis for patient choice is rooted in Hirschman’s15 principle 
of ‘voting your feet.’ The general idea is that consumers have 
the option to withdraw or complain when there is a decline 
in the quality of service and/or benefit. Thus, those who 
are unhappy with their organization may exit to another 
organization for a better service. By withdrawing, consumers 
(eg, enrolees) substitute non-performing providers for 
performing ones. This substitution of providers will require 
consumers (enrolees) desiring high-quality care at minimal 
costs to acquire information regarding prices and quality of 
different healthcare providers to make an informed decision 
as to which provider best meets their preferences and needs. 
Every insured member, based on his/her own information, 
chooses (and sometimes changes) PPP in this system. 
Consequently, examining the factors that influence patients’ 
choice of PPP could be important towards ensuring quality 
in healthcare delivery via patient choice. Our objective in 
this paper is to investigate the factors that affect the choice 
of PPP, and their direction of association and magnitude 
with the choice of PPP. Indeed, some studies on patient 
hospital (provider) choice and/or utilisation of healthcare 
services have been conducted in developing countries16-20 and 
developed countries.1,6,8,9,21-24 However, most of these studies, 
eg, Dzator and Asafu-Adjaye,17 examined patient hospital 
choice under conditions where price (user fees) existed and/
or for a particular disease. Similar to Varkevisser et al,9 the 
present study focuses on factors that affect the choice of PPP 
in the absence of user fees for insured persons.
Methods
Study Design
The study used a cross-sectional research design. Thus, a short 
community-based survey was used to collect data at a specific 
point in time, without any follow-up. Questionnaires were 
used to elicit information from respondents. Generally, the 
cross-sectional study design allows different variables to be 
compared simultaneously hence our choice of this approach. 
Setting and Population
The study was conducted in the Ashanti Region, which is 
located in the middle belt of Ghana. The region has 4 780 380 
inhabitants representing 19.4% of Ghana’s entire population25 
with a mixture of rural and urban communities as well as a 
representative collection of small, medium, and big healthcare 
facilities. Administratively, the region is divided into 27 
districts as at 2010 to facilitate the decentralisation process. 
Currently, the NHIA is practicing the patient list system (PPP) 
in the region. Since the objective of this study is to learn how 
enrolees choose their PPPs, the choice of Ashanti Region for 
this study is justified. This is because the patient list system 
was not available in any other region. For the purposes of 
this study, the population comprised of NHIS enrolees in the 
region.26 Eligible participants were insured persons of age 18 
or above who had selected and/or changed their PPP within 6 
months prior to the survey. The study relied solely on primary 
data. 
Sample, Sampling Procedures, and Data Collection
Yamane’s27 [1] sample size formula was applied and the 
minimum sample size was 400 NHIS enrolees using 95% 
confidence and 5% error levels. In order to account for 
damages, incomplete responses, missing questionnaires and 
other problems associated with data collection, 50% extra 
of the sample size was allowed to address such problems. 
It is acknowledged that in most empirical surveys 10% of 
the estimated sample size has been applied to address data 
collection problems. The choice of 50% extra in the present 
study, however, was to help achieve a relatively larger sample 
size for greater efficiency in the multinomial logit estimation.
The sample size was distributed between rural and urban 
districts in the region based on their respective total 
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populations. Prior to this, a list of rural and urban districts[2] 
in the region was made separately after which a simple 
random sampling procedure was applied to select one district 
from each list. In the process, each of the districts was given 
a number based on which the selection was made. Kumasi 
Metro area (urban) and Kwabre East (rural) were the 2 districts 
selected for the study. In each of the selected districts was 
applied a simple random and systematic sampling procedures 
at different stages. 
First, in Kumasi Metro, one submetro (ie, Oforikrom) was 
selected out of the 10 submetros after which systematic 
sampling method was used to select houses to visit in order 
to interview 400 individual enrolees[3]. The selection of 
Oforikrom submetro was based on a list that contained all 
the ten submetros with their assigned numbers. Secondly, in 
Kwabre East district, a list of all the communities was made 
and numbers were assigned based on which the selection 
of 2 villages (ie, Kasaam and Adwumakase-Kese) was done 
without replacement[4]. Thus, once the first village is selected it 
is not replaced. This reduces the total number of villages in the 
next selection. The 2 villages were allotted 100 questionnaires 
each totalling 200. In all cases, the listing and numbering were 
done by the researcher(s). 
There was no listing of houses. The first house was picked and 
subsequently every fifth house was visited. If the subsequent 
house has no eligible member, the next house was visited in 
order to get eligible participant. This procedure was followed 
until the required sample size was achieved. Once in the 
house, anybody (male or female) present could answer the 
questions posed by the interviewer (or if literate select their 
answers from the questionnaire), provided he/she satisfies 
the eligibility criteria. Only insured persons who had attained 
age 18 or older and had selected and/or changed PPP within 
6 months prior to the study were eligible. Selection of a 
participant in the house was conveniently done. 
Prior to the interview/survey, author-developed research 
questionnaire was first administered to 5 insured persons, 
residents of Kumasi, who had selected their PPPs. However, 
this selection was unscientific. The returned questionnaires 
suggested the need for revision as there was duplication of 
questions while some questions needed multiple responses. 
The revised questionnaire was then administered to eligible 
participants after seeking their verbal consent. 
The questionnaire was designed in way that would help 
capture, for example, information on socio-demographic 
characteristics (eg, gender, age, and income), factors that 
were considered in choosing PPP, whether or not participants 
have switched provider, distance to PPP captured by travel 
time, and transportation cost. Thus, the questionnaire was in 
2 sections. Section A comprised of questions on individual 
or personal characteristics (eg, gender, age, and income). In 
section B, the questions were related to, for example, the type 
of PPP chosen, why that PPP was chosen, and location of the 
chosen PPP.
Predictive Model for Choice of Preferred Primary Healthcare 
Provider
In most of the relevant literature, decisions about hospital 
choice among patients are discrete. Therefore, they can be 
modelled quantitatively. Likewise, decisions regarding the 
choice of PPP can also be modelled quantitatively. In line with 
such authors as Amaghionyeodiwe,18 and Chul-Young and 
Keon-Hyung24 enrolees were assumed to choose their PPP 
from among Government, Private, and Mission healthcare 
providers (either in their locality or bypassing the nearest 
healthcare provider to a more distant one). The type of 
provider served as the dependent variable. Thus, each enrolee 
chooses his/her PPP on the premise that he/she derives 
maximum utility from treatment at the chosen facility. The 
individual’s conditional expected utility function is given as:
Uij = Vij (Di, Hj)                                                                           (1)
Where Uij is the individual’s expected utility conditional on 
receiving treatment from PPP (provider) j, Vij (Hj, Di) is the 
observed utility; Dj is a vector of individual characteristics 
such as age, gender, income, education, and location; Hj 
is a vector of PPP characteristics such as drug availability, 
doctors, and proximity of the facility to the individual. Hence, 
an enrolee’s conditional expected utility can be given as: 
Uij = Vij (PPP/Di, Hj)                                                                   (2)
In effect, the enrolee chooses his PPP given his/her own 
characteristics, disease (illness) features, and that of the 
healthcare provider to maximise his/her utility from 
treatment. Thus, the enrolee chooses his/her PPP given his/
her income, gender, education, and facility features such as 
drug availability, charges aside insurance, and availability of 
healthcare personnel. The reduced form of the utility function 
is presented below:
Uij = Vij (PPP/Di, Hj) = α + β1Di + β2Hj + δi                             (3)
where all notations are as previously defined, and the error 
term is represented by δi. Here the enrolee chooses provider 
or facility j if and only if it offers him/her the highest utility. 
In general, the probability of an enrolee choosing provider j as 
PPP given facility and individual features is given by:
 
 
j j
j j
X
ij X
α β
α β
δπ
δ
+
+= ∑
                                                                             (4)
Where πij is the probability that enrolee i would select 
healthcare provider j as his/her PPP, δ is the error term, αj is the 
intercept while βj is the vector coefficients of the independent 
variables (X) and X is a vector of variables affecting the choice 
of healthcare provider as detailed above. In order to measure 
the direction of association of the factors with choice of PPP, 
the study makes use of multinomial logistic regression. The 
choice of multinomial logistic regression stems from the 
multicategory (dissimilar) nature of the options available to 
the enrolee, and it is consistent with studies modelling choice 
behaviour.16-18 
Since an enrolee chooses a PPP irrespective of sickness, this 
study excludes disease specific features of the individual. 
Thus, we make use of individual characteristics such as 
gender, education, age, income, residence, and facility 
features such as drug availability, waiting time and other 
factors such as distance between the individual’s residence 
and the facility and travel time. These served as independent 
variables in the multinomial logistic regression. While 
patients’ characteristics are very influential in selecting a 
particular healthcare provider, the characteristics of the 
provider are equally important. This is because the enrolee 
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might choose a particular healthcare provider mainly due to 
certain characteristics that the provider possesses. 
Data Analysis 
The data was first entered in Microsoft Excel, and verified 
before transferring same to Stata 11. Both descriptive and 
inferential statistics were used to analyse the data. The 
differences in responses and background information were 
obtained using percentages, averages and standard deviations. 
A multinomial logistic regression was used to ascertain the 
direction of associations between the independent variables 
and choice of PPP, and their magnitudes. All categorical 
independent variables entered the regression equation in the 
form of indicator variables, taking the values of zero and one 
(0 and 1) accordingly. For statistical significance, P value of 
.05 or less was applied. 
Results 
Data Description 
Overall, 600 participants were recruited for the study. 
However, 496 questionnaires were retained for further 
analysis after accounting for incomplete, damaged, and 
missing questionnaires. This gave a response rate of nearly 
83% and was satisfactory. Most of the respondents recruited 
for the study came from urban centres following the large 
number of residents in these areas, and constituted 68.15% of 
the sample. The rural respondents were 31.85% of the sample. 
The average age of a respondent was 35.65 years (SD = 13.64) 
and the average monthly income was GH¢ 579.65. The mean 
travel time for a respondent to visit his/her PPP was 55 
minutes and 38 seconds (SD = 36 minutes) while the average 
transportation cost was GH¢ 9.65 (SD = 5.92). Females 
constituted a larger share of the respondents (see Table 
1). Again, 80.65% of the respondents were employed and 
married people constituted 64.52% of the sample. Regarding 
educational background, only 5.65% of the respondents 
had no formal education. For those with formal education, 
12.10% of the respondents had completed basic school (ie, 
junior secondary/high school) as at the time of the study. 
Post-basic school leavers from senior secondary/high, 
technical and/or vocational schools constituted 12.10% of 
the sample. Finally, 70.16% of the respondents had attained 
tertiary education (ie, post-secondary school education eg, 
polytechnic, university, college of education, and/or nursing). 
The socio-demographic characteristics of respondents such 
as employment and marital status, and their travel time and 
transport cost are presented in Table 1.
Criteria for Selecting Preferred Primary Healthcare Provider 
Among Enrolees 
Majority of the respondents chose government health 
facilities as their PPPs. This represented 59.48% of the total 
sample. Enrolees who registered with private healthcare 
providers in the region constituted 33.27% of the respondents 
while mission healthcare providers accounted for 7.26% of 
the sample. Most (73.39%) of the PPPs chosen were located 
within Kumasi metropolis. 
Concerning the criteria for selecting PPPs, the respondents 
indicated that proximity, shorter waiting times, availability 
of essential drugs, and doctors were among the criteria used. 
Table 1. Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Respondents
Variable Proportion
Residence (%)
Rural 31.85
Urban 68.15
Gender (%)
Male 48.39
Female 51.61
Employment (%)
Employed 80.65
Unemployed 19.35
Education (%)
Basic (Junior secondary/high School) 12.10
Secondary/technical/vocational 12.10
Tertiary (Post secondary/technical/vocational) 70.16
Uneducated 5.65
Marital status
Married 64.52
Single 35.48
Mean income (in Ghana cedisa) 579.65
(SD) (346.75)
Mean Age (in completed years) 35.65
(SD) (13.64)
Mean travel time (in minutes) 55.38
(SD) (36.28)
Mean transport cost (in Ghana cedis) 9.65
(SD) (5.92)
a US$1 = GH¢3.8.
Table 2. Criteria for PPP Selection in Ashanti Region
Criteria Proportion of Respondents (%)
Availability of drugs 53.63
Shorter waiting time 39.92
Proximity 49.60
Clean environment 39.52
Availability of doctors 39.92
Presence of additional charges aside insurance 37.10
Reputation of the provider 39.52
Recommendation from friends, co-workers, etc 48.79
Abbreviation: PPP, preferred primary healthcare provider.  
Table 2 summarizes the criteria for selecting a PPP in Ashanti 
Region among enrolees.
It is evident from Table 2 that more than half of NHIS 
enrolees selected their PPPs based on availability of essential 
drugs. Such information was made known via their past 
visits and recommendation. Another important criterion was 
distance. A percentage (49.60%) of the enrolees preferred 
to be treated in a nearby health facility or hospital. Again, 
recommendations were also key in PPP selection as 48.79% 
based their selection on recommendation from friends, co-
workers, and family members. Further, averagely 39% of 
the sample included reputation of the provider, availability 
of doctors, clean environment, and shorter waiting times in 
the selection criteria. None of the enrolees switched provider 
within 6 months prior to the study.
Estimates From Multinomial Logistic Regression for Choice 
of Preferred Primary Healthcare Provider
The full maximum likelihood estimation method was used 
Boachie
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2016, 5(3), 155–163 159
to fit the multinomial logistic regression. Our objective here 
was to measure the extent of association of some the factors 
(see Table 2) or their influence on enrolees’ decision to 
choose a particular PPP. As explained earlier, the choice of 
PPP (government, private or mission) was dependent on both 
individual and facility characteristics. The results from the 
multinomial logistic regression are summarized in Table 3.
The overall regression estimates are satisfactory. The likelihood 
ratio chi-square was statistically significant suggesting that 
at least one of the regression coefficients was statistically 
different from zero. The pseudo R2 was approximately 0.37 
implying that about 37% of the changes in the dependent 
variable are explained by the independent variables presented 
in the model. These estimated coefficients indicate how the 
factors influence the likelihood of an enrolee selecting a 
particular PPP. The negative sign of an estimated coefficient 
indicates a lesser chance or likelihood while a positive sign of 
the coefficient indicates a greater chance of selection. 
Gender was significant in deciding whether to join private 
PPP. However, it was statistically insignificant in determining 
the decision to select a government owned facility as PPP. The 
coefficient of gender was negative for both government and 
private providers. In addition, enrolee’s age was positively 
related to the demand for healthcare services from both public 
and private providers. It was, however, statistically significant 
at 10% for only private providers. 
The level of an enrolee’s education was not significant in 
determining his/her choice of PPP in Ashanti Region. 
Surprisingly, the coefficients were negative for both public 
and private healthcare providers at all levels of education. 
Further, income was negatively related to the choice of 
government providers at 1% and private providers at 10%. 
Again, the effect of enrolees’ residence was statistically 
Table 3. Multinomial Logistic Estimates for Choice of PPP
Variable Government Providers Private Providers
Coefficients Coefficients 
Enrolee characteristics
Gender: male -0.3527 -2.8886a
Age 0.0264 0.0328b
Basic education -19.6099 -19.1138
Secondary education -16.9830 -14.2808
Tertiary education -16.8314 -16.7729
Income -0.0027a -0.0010b
Residence-rural -0.9321b -2.6162a
Facility features 
Availability of drugs 1.2253 2.5911a
Shorter waiting time -0.1320 1.4486a
Clean environment 0.1208 -1.1775b
Availability of Doctors -1.8210a 1.9270a
Presence of additional 
charges aside insurance 
-2.1442a -1.2934c
Reputation of the provider -2.0851a -2.6946a
Distance (travel time) -0.0005 0.0005
Constant 23.1486 19.6297
Abbreviation: PPP, preferred primary healthcare provider. 
a, b, c Denotes significance at 1%. 10%, and 5% level, respectively.
Summary Statistics: Obs, 496; R2-Pseudo, 0.3705; Log-likelihood, 270.2479; 
LR chi-square (28), 318.1400; P value: .0000. 
Base outcome is mission health providers.
Results obtained from STATA version 11.
insignificant for government providers. Precisely, the sign of 
the coefficient of residing in a rural community was negative 
for both government and private providers. However, it was 
significant at 1% for private providers while the negative effect 
was insignificant at 5% for government healthcare providers. 
Facility features such as availability of drugs and doctors, 
shorter waiting times, clean environment, provider’s 
reputation, and presence of additional charges were found to 
exert significant influence on an enrolee’s decision to select a 
particular provider as PPP within the sample. The availability 
of essential drugs was a positive determinant of PPP. While 
this was statistically significant at 1% for private healthcare 
providers, it was insignificant for government PPPs. 
Shorter waiting time was a positive determinant of private 
healthcare providers’ services while it was negative for public 
providers, and it was statistically significant at 1% for private 
providers. Furthermore, clean environment was positively 
related to the choice of government PPP though insignificant 
while it related negatively to the choice of private providers 
and statistically insignificant at 5% level. The availability of 
medical doctors in a particular facility was found to be very 
influential in selecting PPPs among enrolees. This criterion 
was statistically significant at 1% for both government and 
private providers in the region though they moved in opposite 
directions. Specifically, availability of doctors was positive 
for private providers while it remained negative for public 
providers. 
The presence of additional charges in a facility and reputation 
of the provider were negative in terms of their influence on 
enrolees’ decision to choose a particular facility as PPP. As 
shown in Table 3, its effect was negative for both government 
and private providers. The coefficient of providers’ reputation 
was negative and statistically significant at 1% for both 
government and private providers. Distance (measured in 
travel time) was, however, not a significant determinant of 
PPP choice among enrolees. However, its sign was negative 
for public while it remained positive for private providers. 
Discussion 
In the present study, 496 respondents have provided 
information on the factors they considered/consider when 
choosing a PPP. Our results suggest a large number of 
female subscribers of the health insurance policy. This high 
percentage of females in the present study could emanate 
from their frequent use of healthcare services and thus their 
interest in subscribing to the health insurance policy. Another 
possibility for this high percentage is the absence of men in 
the house as at the time of interview. However, we consider 
the difference in male and female percentages to be marginal 
since it is below 10%. 
The findings on employment and education are interesting. 
We find that 80.65% of the respondents were employed as at 
the time of the study. A possible reason for this percentage is 
that there were only 2 options regarding employment status 
and as such those who did not find their category might have 
selected ‘‘employed’’ option. For example, the questionnaire 
did not have any option for students and this could account 
for the high percentage. Further, there was no categorisation 
of employment, which is a shortfall of the present study. 
Similarly, the demographic information reveals a high 
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percentage of people with tertiary education and low 
percentage with basic or secondary education. Perhaps, a 
significant portion of these people was still in school, which 
our questionnaire did not capture. Indeed, the absence of 
some options on the questionnaire might have accounted 
for this. Another finding about the sample is on income. We 
find that the average income in the sample was GH¢ 579.65. 
This high average income could be due to some outliers in 
the sample that might have accounted for the large variation 
in income. 
The study has shown that most of the PPPs selected are 
located in the Kumasi metropolis, and most of them are public 
facilities. We do not find this to be surprising given the large 
number of residents. Again, the high level of infrastructural 
development and other facilities in the metropolis make 
it conducive for entities such as hospitals to be sited. The 
higher preference for government health providers stems, 
partly, from the withdrawal of services by private healthcare 
providers on grounds of low capitated rates in the early stages 
of the PPP.
The findings regarding continuity of care contradicts 
Boachie’s11 findings that enrolees in the patient list system 
had a higher probability of switching providers during the 
piloting stage of the programme. Indeed, the early stages of 
the patient list system witnessed some hitches. Most patients 
were turned away by providers, particularly private providers, 
on grounds that those patients were not on their register. 
This problem was due to the random assignment of enrolees 
to providers without the knowledge of concerned enrolees.11 
However, such issues were later addressed. This could explain 
the results in the present study.
Intuitively, the insured have their own guidelines in selecting a 
PPP when given a choice. We find that enrolees selected their 
PPPs based on perceived availability of drugs and doctors in 
such facilities. Thus, enrolees chose facilities that have high 
probability of consulting a doctor, and also receive essential 
drugs. Usually, this information is made known through 
past visits or from friends/family members. Another criteria 
adopted was distance or proximity to the facility. Proximity to 
the health facility is indicative of lower transport cost (in both 
money and non-monetary terms) thus inducing enrolees 
to choose closer facilities. This could be the reason for the 
present results. In Nigeria, Amaghionyeodiwe18 has reported 
that 33% of respondents changed healthcare provider due to 
proximity. Similar to the findings reported by Schwartz et al6 
among elderly people in the United States, recommendations 
were important criteria used by enrolees in selecting PPPs. 
In addition, waiting time was one of the criteria used in 
selecting PPPs. Waiting time in health facilities is one of 
the non-pecuniary costs to the patient. Undeniably, patients 
prefer to spend less time in health facilities hence 39.92% 
of respondents using this criterion. Again, we find that 
provider reputation, clean environment, additional charges 
and recommendation were key guidelines that were adopted 
by enrolees. The enrolee’s past visits and recommendations 
from friends, families, and co-workers could reveal essential 
information on, for instance, waiting time, sanitation, 
availability of drugs and doctors, and extra charges. 
In examining the direction of association of some of these 
factors in the multinomial regression, we find that such 
individual specific characteristics as gender and age were 
significant in selecting PPP. Our results suggest that males 
gave less preference to private PPPs relative to females. We 
find this to be surprising. This is because males are mostly 
the breadwinners in traditional Ghanaian family settings, 
and as such will have a higher opportunity cost in seeking 
care. Given that private PPPs provide services within a short 
period, one would expect males to prefer such PPPs but our 
findings suggest otherwise. We are unable to find reasons for 
this behavior. This calls for further research in this area. 
In addition, each additional year increases the likelihood 
of an enrolee demanding the services of private healthcare 
providers. These findings are similar to those reported by 
Chul-Young and Keon-Hyung24 in the United States, and 
Amaghionyeodiwe18 in Nigeria. However, the insignificant 
negative effect of education deviates absolutely from the 
findings of Amaghionyeodiwe.18
Further, income significantly influences the choice of PPPs. 
Specifically, increase in income reduces the likelihood of an 
enrolee selecting both government and private providers as 
PPP. However, the negative effect of rising income on private 
providers was less pronounced resulting, perhaps, from the 
shorter waiting time, and continuous availability of doctors to 
attend to patients. This resonates with the argument advanced 
by Amaghionyeodiwe18 that high-income earners perceive the 
quality of care in private health facilities to be higher with less 
time than in publicly owned facilities. In addition, Adaman et 
al19 have reported findings, similar to the present study, that 
the rich or people with high socio-economic status are more 
likely to choose private hospitals due to the shorter-waiting 
time and perceived quality. These could be the reason for the 
current results.
Again, residing in a rural community was negatively 
associated with selecting government or private providers, 
and is consistent with findings reported by Bour.20 However, 
this was statistically significant at conventional levels for only 
private PPPs.
The implication is that rural dwellers were less likely to 
select private providers as their PPP as compared with 
public and mission providers. This stems from the fact 
that most private health facilities are located in cities. In 
addition, most healthcare facilities in rural settings belong 
to either government or religious bodies thereby making it 
convenient for rural dwellers to utilise healthcare service in 
such facilities hence the insignificant effect of rural-residence 
on public PPPs. Again, the negative coefficient suggests some 
inequalities in healthcare use. Thus, between urban and rural 
areas, there exist some inequalities in accessing healthcare 
services, particularly services by private providers. There 
is an urgent need to address these issues of inequalities in 
healthcare utilisation. 
Also, facility features such as availability of drugs and 
doctors, shorter waiting times, clean environment, provider’s 
reputation, and presence of additional charges highly 
influence enrolees’ decision to select a particular provider 
as PPP, or even healthcare provider in general. The enrolees 
expecting to receive essential drugs select private providers 
due to their continuous supply of such drugs. The implication 
is that enrolees who expect to receive essential drugs will 
select private providers as their PPP rather than government 
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providers. This suggests that private providers supply essential 
drugs to their patients than public providers. 
As already indicated, waiting time in health facilities is one 
of the non-pecuniary costs to the patient, and, in most cases, 
private providers are perceived to reduce this type of cost 
for patients. Our present results may partly emanate from 
the punctuality of doctors and other medical staff in private 
facilities. Another possible reason for the shorter waiting 
time in private facilities could be due to the fewer number 
of clients they serve since most people utilise public health 
facilities thereby causing less pressure on private facilities. 
The findings corroborate Varkevisser and van der Geest8 
results concerning hospital bypassing, Amaghionyeodiwe’s18 
explanation for the choice of private hospitals among higher 
income groups in Nigeria, and Naasegnibe and Dary16 that 
time is a very important factor in deciding where to seek care 
in Northern Ghana. 
The availability of doctors in a particular facility influences 
the selection of PPPs among enrolees. The results for 
government providers could be attributed to the dual practice 
by most of the medical doctors. Most private health facilities 
are owned, and (sometimes) operated by health professionals 
working in government facilities. Since revenue of private 
practice depends mostly on the number of patients, it becomes 
expedient for doctors to be punctual in such facilities and that 
could reduce waiting time in such private facilities. Usually, 
such doctors spend more time on their private practice than 
in the government facilities where remuneration is fixed. 
In some cases, supplier-induced demand in medical care is 
rampant among private practitioners. These, perhaps, are 
the reasons for the current results. These findings regarding 
provider characteristics confirm Varkevisser and van der 
Geest’s8,9 findings that hospital or facility features play a key 
role in hospital choice, or, in this case, PPP choice. 
In choosing PPPs, enrolees were more likely to stay away 
from facilities that charge fees aside the insurance. The 
negative coefficients suggest that all the providers, whether 
government or private facilities, charged extra fees regardless 
of the insurance. The presence of additional fees in health 
facilities could be due to co-payments or payments for 
uncovered benefits under the insurance scheme though the 
study did not investigate the purpose for such fees. However, 
the effect was more pronounced among government providers 
than among private providers in the region as shown by their 
respective significance levels and coefficients. This additional 
fee charged could reduce utilisation of healthcare services, 
especially for the poor. Undoubtedly, user fee reduces 
utilisation of healthcare services in most cases and Boachie11 
found that charging an extra fee aside insurance reduced visits 
among patients under fee-for-service and capitated plans. 
Provider reputation is among the factors influencing 
healthcare utilization decisions. Thus, providers who provide 
quality healthcare services in the form of shorter waiting time, 
provision of essential drugs to patients, clean environment, 
politeness of healthcare staff and other modern medical 
equipment would be expected to attract more patients. 
However, the negative and statistically significant coefficient 
of providers’ reputation indicates that providers were less 
reputed. This could be due to the fact that some of the 
selected PPPs lacked some qualities such as modern medical 
equipment, shorter waiting time and/or essential drugs. 
The regression result on distance (measured in travel time) was 
statistically insignificant determinant of PPP choice among 
enrolees, despite 49.6% of respondents using this criterion. The 
supply of essential drugs, shorter waiting time, and perceived 
quality of care could render distance unimportant in selecting 
a particular PPP. Indeed, Montefiori,7 Varkevisser and van der 
Geest8,9 have argued that [private] healthcare providers who 
provide compensation in the form of shorter waiting time, 
availability of essential drugs and doctors inter alia to patients 
are more likely to be chosen and that could render distance 
irrelevant for patients. In this case, patients may substitute 
distant healthcare providers for nearer ones due to differences 
in quality of care. This, perhaps, explains the insignificant 
coefficient of distance in the multinomial regression. In this 
study, the insignificant coefficient of distance deviates from 
that of Varkevisser and van der Geest,8,9 Naasegnibe and 
Dary,16 Amaghionyeodiwe,18 Chul-Young and Keon-Hyung24 
and Bour20 who found distance to be a significant factor in 
healthcare provider choice. 
Conclusion 
In this study, the purpose was to investigate the factors that 
affect the choice of PPP and their direction of association with 
PPP. One advantage of patient choice and behaviour research 
is that it enables health insurers to know the individual, facility 
and other characteristics influencing the choice of PPP to aid 
their purchasing roles. It also helps hospital administrators 
to optimize their provision of healthcare services. Certain 
characteristics of the providers were used as a basis for PPP 
selection in the Ashanti Region. The study has revealed 
that shorter waiting time, availability of essential drugs and 
doctors, proximity, recommendations, clean environment 
and presence of additional charges were the criteria adopted 
by enrolees in choosing their PPPs. 
These findings provide impetus for healthcare providers 
to improve on their quality levels by reducing waiting time, 
ensuring a constant supply of essential drugs, recruiting 
and making sure that doctors are at work, provide proper 
sanitation, and above all, remove additional charges that may 
restrict the insured from accessing healthcare. 
More specifically, government healthcare providers should 
endeavour to ensure that medical doctors are always available 
to attend to patients while removing all charges (except eg, 
co-payment) for the insured. These factors were statistically 
significant. On the part of private providers, further reduction 
in waiting time via, for example, punctuality of medical staff, 
and removal of additional charges coupled with improved 
sanitation will not be a wasteful investment. Though not 
emanating directly from the study, NHIA should also ensure 
timely release of funds to providers to help procure the 
necessary medical supplies towards enhancing the work of 
both medical and nonmedical staff. This will improve service 
quality in the form of, for example, essential drugs, and clean 
environment. 
Further, government should ensure adequate provision of 
infrastructure, particularly in rural areas to help reduce 
inequalities in healthcare use. The lack of adequate healthcare 
infrastructure in rural communities has been revealed by 
the negative coefficient of residing in rural areas. This limits 
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healthcare utilisation among rural dwellers. In addressing 
such issues, while government expands the concept of 
community health planning services (CHPS) in rural areas, 
providing some incentives to private and mission providers to 
establish in rural areas will also help increase the number of 
primary healthcare facilities. This will require investments in 
such infrastructure as road networks, electricity, water supply, 
and telecommunications, which are lacking in rural areas. 
The investment in infrastructure, especially road networks, 
will provide easy means of transport to access health facilities 
in distant communities. 
Admittedly, the profit maximization rule in economic theory, 
ie, marginal revenue equals marginal cost, makes the survival of 
private and/or mission primary healthcare providers in rural 
areas blur, given the low incomes in such areas. However, since 
the NHIA’s capitated rate for primary healthcare is uniform, 
though varies among the three providers, irrespective of 
geographical location, it seems possible for private and/or 
mission providers to satisfy the profit maximization rule in 
rural areas regarding primary healthcare. Again, such private 
and/or mission providers operating in rural areas could be 
given top-up rate to cater for their location.
Limitations of the Study
This study is not without limitations. First, no qualitative 
assessment was done to find out the factors that influence 
PPP decisions. The qualitative approach could provide 
some detailed information about the decision-making 
process regarding ‘‘how and why’’ in PPP decisions among 
enrolees. In addition, the study did not elicit information 
from healthcare providers or PPPs and regulators, especially 
NHIA. Such information from providers and NHIA would 
have provided a better understanding of the patient list 
system and the choice process. Further, employment status 
and income of respondents were not categorized into groups. 
Such categorisation could also provide information on how 
different employment and income groups choose PPPs. 
Qualitative analysis on the theme could be done in the future 
while incorporating these concerns to understand, better, how 
and why enrolees make decisions regarding PPPs. Finally, 
our pre-testing of the questionnaire used a small number of 
people. This, perhaps, did not help to reveal all shortcomings 
of the questionnaire. Future pre-testing should use relatively 
more people to help reveal the shortcomings in the research 
instrument. 
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Endnotes
[1] The formula is given by ( )2
 
1
Nn
N e
=
+
, where n is the required sample size, N 
is the population, and e is the error level. The study assumed 95% confidence 
level.
[2] For the purposes of this study, all metropolitan, municipal, and district 
administrative areas are termed as districts.
[3] In the present study, a house means a dwelling unit or dwelling place for 
people. The residents may or may not share living arrangements. Thus, they 
may or may not eat from the same ‘cooking pot.’ Residents may or may not be 
blood relations. The house is selected so that eligible residents can be part of 
the study.
[4] See http://www.kwabre.ghanadistricts.gov.gh/ for details on communities in 
Kwabre East District. 
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